

~~SENSITIVE~~

*CIA/SAVA / WVINW 710821*



## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 21 August 1971*


**NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971  
Weekly average for each month




MAY 1971 - AUGUST 1971  
Weekly data as reported

## US BATTLE DEATHS




dropped from last week's 13 to 9 -- the lowest total since August of 1965 when there were only 90,000 troops in-country.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




rose to 235 from the 183 of last week. The official total will change and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




consisted of one small, special purpose group with 3 personnel. The infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 remains at some 75,600 - 77,600.

## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




decreased to 276 from the 317 of last week.

## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



jumped to 1,729 from last week's 1,319.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces decreased to 83% from the 87% of last week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity along the DMZ and northern Quang Tri Province remained at moderate to fairly high levels during the past week, but continued at a reduced scale in other parts of the country. A slight increase in activity may occur this week as the Communists attempt to influence or disrupt the GVN Lower House elections, but with the possible exception of northern MR 1, no large-scale tactical activity is indicated.

In north Laos, small unit engagements and enemy attacks by fire have continued near Khang Khai as friendly forces, who remain in possession of most of the Plain of Jars, discovered and destroyed additional enemy materiel. In south Laos, there has been scattered fighting around the government-held town of Saravane in the southern Panhandle and heavy fighting on the Bolovens Plateau, where government forces are still trying to recapture Paksong.

The increase in Communist military activity in Cambodia this week was centered on Kampot City, where the enemy initiated seven incidents on 18 August. Enemy activity throughout the rest of the country was confined to guerrilla-type attacks against lines of communication and sporadic attacks by fire against FANK defensive positions. During the week, the government launched three new operations including CHENLA II, a major clearing effort along Route 6, which ultimately may extend as far north as Kompong Thom City. So far, however, this operation has been stalled by enemy interdiction of Route 6.

Enemy Infiltration

Only one small, special purpose group was detected during the past week and the estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam/Cambodia since 1 October 1970 remains at some 75,600 - 77,600.

South Vietnam Developments

Present indications are that President Thieu will proceed with the scheduled presidential election despite the withdrawal of both Minh and Ky. [REDACTED] Thieu stated on 23 August that he will not resign the presidency in order to permit a new election as demanded by Ky. Unless Thieu changes his mind, he will probably try to treat the 3 October election as a referendum in which Thieu will seek the approval of a majority of the voters for his policies. Ky's name will remain on the ballot, however, and he retains the option of reassuming his candidacy at a later date. 25X1C

Meanwhile, the government's intensive organizational efforts are expected to result in a majority of the 159 seats going to pro-government candidates in next Sunday's Lower House elections. [REDACTED] many local officials have employed threats and other unfair tactics against opposition candidates and their supporters, and a number of these opposition candidates are threatening to withdraw in protest. Despite the odds, opposition candidates supported by An Quang Buddhists are expected to do well in some areas, thus ensuring the continued presence of a significant opposition bloc in the Lower House. Given the current presidential election imbroglio, the Lower House contest results will probably be widely regarded as having considerable symbolic importance. If a majority of the seats are not won by GVN supporters, Thieu will be considered to have suffered a defeat and considerable loss of face. A pro-government landslide, on the other hand, would be viewed with cynical skepticism. Such a result, particularly if accompanied by widespread polling irregularities, would further unsettle the already charged political atmosphere in South Vietnam.